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The Cartesian argument against physicalism 
Philip Goff 
 
I’m an analytic metaphysician who thinks analytic metaphysicians don’t think enough 
about consciousness. By consciousness I mean the property of being a thing such that there’s 
something that it’s like to be that thing. There’s something that it’s like for a rabbit to be cold, 
or to be kicked, or to have a knife stuck in it. There’s nothing that it’s like (or so we ordinarily 
suppose) for a table to be cold, or to be kicked, or to have a knife stuck in it. There’s nothing 
that it’s like from the inside, as it were, to be a table. We mark this difference by saying that 
the rabbit, but not that table, is conscious.  
The property of consciousness is special because we know for certain that it is 
instantiated. Not only that but we know for certain that consciousness as we ordinarily 
conceive of it is instantiated. I am not claiming that we know everything there is to know 
about consciousness, or that we never make mistakes about our own conscious experience. 
My claim is simply that one is justified in being certain—believing with a credence of 1—
that there is something that it’s like to be oneself, according to one’s normal understanding of 
what it would be for there to be something that it’s like to be oneself. 
This makes our relationship with consciousness radically different from our 
relationship with any other feature of reality. Much metaphysics begins from certain 
‘Moorean truths’; truths of common sense that it would be intolerable to deny. Perhaps it is a 
Moorean truth that some or all of the following things exist: persons, time, space, freedom, 
value, solid matter. But it would be difficult to justify starting metaphysical enquiry from the 
conviction that these things must exist as we ordinarily conceive of them. We must remain 
open to science and philosophy overturning our folk notions of what it is for someone to be 
free, or for something to be solid, or for time to pass. 
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Matters are different when it comes to consciousness. It is not simply that I can gesture 
at some property of ‘consciousness’ with folk platitudes, and have confidence that something 
satisfies the bulk of those platitudes. When I entertain the proposition <there is something 
that it’s like to be me>, I know that that very proposition (not it or some revision of it 
containing a slightly different concept of ‘being something such that there’s something that 
it’s like to be it’) is true. 
You can’t build a satisfactory metaphysical theory wholly from the datum that there is 
consciousness; that datum is after all consistent with solipsism. We must continue to rely on 
Moorean truths, empirical data and the weighing of theoretical virtues in trying to formulate 
our best guess as to what reality is like. But because the datum that there is consciousness (as 
we ordinarily conceive it) is unrevisable, it ought to occupy a central place in enquiry; a fixed 
point around which other considerations revolve. I call an approach to analytic metaphysics 
that grants the reality of consciousness this central place ‘analytic phenomenology’.  
The potential of this datum is grossly underexplored; it has arguable implications for 
the nature of time, persistence, properties, composition, objecthood and personal identity. 
Time will tell, but it is possible that, with an agreed source of unrevisable data, analytic 
phenomenologists may achieve some degree of consensus on certain key questions, a goal 
which has so far eluded other schools of metaphysics.  
Perhaps the most famous alleged implication of the reality of consciousness is the 
falsity of physicalism. In what follows I will present an argument against standard physicalist 
attempts to account for consciousness. In my undergraduate lectures, Descartes’ arguments 
against materialism were presented as objects for target practice rather than serious 
evaluation. At the time it seemed to me that there was more to the arguments than they were 
being given credit for. I now think Descartes’ Meditations provides us with the resources for a 
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sound argument against standard contemporary forms of physicalism. In what follows I shall 
present this argument.  
In the final section, I will highlight a distinctive advantage of this argument: if sound, it 
demonstrates the non-physicality not only of sensory experience, but also of thought. 
 
1. The second meditation and the refutation of analytic functionalism 
Physicalism is the metaphysical view that nothing in actual concrete reality is anything 
over and above the physical. There is a great divide amongst physicalists over the 
epistemological implications of that metaphysical doctrine. A priori physicalists, whom I 
shall consider in this first section, believe that all facts are a priori entailed by the physical 
facts. If you knew the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of every fundamental particle and 
field, and you were clever enough, you could in principle work out a priori all the other facts: 
what the chemical composition of water is, who won the Second World War, how many 
number one hits the Beatles had, etc.
1
 
Perhaps the trickiest case for the a priori physicalist is mentality. Prima facie it doesn’t 
seem possible to move a priori from the kind of facts brain science delivers to the facts about 
consciousness. A colour blind brain scientist could know all the physical facts about colour 
experience without knowing what it’s like to see colours. A brain scientist who’s never tasted 
a lemon could not work out how they taste from poking around in someone’s brain.
2
 Or at 
least that’s how things seem. If she wants to have a plausible, fully worked out view, the a 
priori physicalist cannot just brutally assert that, contrary to appearances, the mental facts do 
follow a priori from the physical facts, but must give some plausible account of mental 
concepts which has this implication. 
The standard way of doing this is to adopt some form of analytic functionalism, i.e. to 
give some kind of causal analysis of mental concepts. The straightforward analytic 
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functionalist says that mental concepts denote higher-order functional states, for example, the 
concept of pain denotes the state of having some more fundamental state that ‘plays the pain 
role’, i.e. (roughly) that responds to bodily damage by instigating avoidance behaviour. On 
the more subtle ‘Australian’ form of analytic functionalism, defended by David Armstrong 
and David Lewis, mental concepts are non-rigid designators which pick out certain states in 
virtue of the higher-level functional states they realise.
3
 Just as the concept ‘head of state’ 
picks out in each country the individual that happens to be the head of state in that country, so 
‘pain’ picks out in each population the state that happens to play the pain role in that 
population.  
It is clear that both forms of analytic functionalism are forms of a priori physicalism. 
Suppose Jennifer’s c-fibres are firing, and the firing of c-fibres is the state that plays the pain 
role both in Jennifer and in the human population in general. For the straightforward analytic 
functionalist, if I know all the physical facts I will be able to work out that Jennifer is in a 
state that plays the pain role, and can infer from this information that Jennifer is in pain. For 
the Australian analytic functionalist, if I know all the physical facts I will know that Jennifer 
instantiates the state that plays the pain role in humans, and can infer from this information 
that Jennifer is in pain. In either case, the mental facts can be deduced from the physical facts. 
The second meditation provides the resources for a decisive refutation of both of these forms 
of analytic functionalism. By the end of the second meditation I have doubted the existence 
of my body and my brain, and of the entire physical world around me. For all I know for 
certain, my apparent experience of all these things might be an especially vivid hallucination 
instigated by an omnipotent evil demon. This demon might have bought me into existence 
just a moment ago—with false memories of a long history and expectations of a similar 
future—and may destroy me a moment hence. I discover that the only thing the demon 
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cannot be deceiving me about is my own existence as a thinking thing: no matter how much 
the demon is deceiving me I must exist as a thinking thing in order to be deceived. 
At the end of this guided meditation, when I have doubted the existence of anything 
physical whilst at the same time enjoying the certain knowledge that I exist as a thinking 
thing, I find I am conceiving of myself as a pure and lonely thinker: a thing which has 
existence only in the present moment, and that has no characteristics other than its present 
mode of thought and experience.
4
 The fact that I can conceive of myself as a pure and lonely 
thinker is inconsistent with the analytic functionalist analysis of mental concepts. For the 
straightforward analytic functionalist, it is a priori that something has a given mental state if 
and only if it has the higher-order state of having some other state that plays the relevant 
causal role. However, a pure and lonely thinker has no states other than the mental states 
themselves: its mental states are not realised in anything more fundamental. If 
straightforward analytic functionalism is true, a pure and lonely thinker is inconceivable. And 
yet a pure and lonely thinker is not inconceivable; the second meditation guides us to its 
conception. 
For the Australian analytic functionalist, it is a priori that something is in pain if and 
only if it has the state that plays the pain role in its population. But a pure and lonely thinker 
does not have a population; it is alone in its world. If Australian analytic functionalism were 
true, a pure and lonely thinker would be inconceivable. And yet by the end of the second 
meditation we end up conceiving of one.  
Lewis does suggest at one point that the population relevant to determining the 
application of mental concepts might be the concept user’s population, rather than the 
population of the creature the concept is being applied to.
5
 However, when I reach the end of 
the second meditation, I am supposing that I am alone in the universe, and hence am not a 
member of any population. If Lewis were right about the reference fixing description of pain, 
 6 
then ‘pain’ would have no application in such a conceivable scenario, just as concept ‘the 
head of state’ has no application in a scenario where there are no countries. And yet, if I read 
the second meditation when I have a headache, I end up conceiving of a scenario in which the 
concept ‘pain’ evidently has application.  
Why have analytic functionalists been so complacent about this incredibly powerful 
argument against their view, an argument which—on the assumption that they took a 
philosophy degree—they cannot possibly have been ignorant of? I think that straightforward 
analytic functionalists have felt unthreatened by Cartesian considerations because their view 
entails that the mental is multiply realised, and allows that in certain non-actual scenarios the 
mental may be realised by non-physical goings on. Whilst functional states in the actual 
scenario may be realised by fleshy mechanisms, in non-actual scenarios they are realised by 
ectoplasm. Therefore, the fact that we can conceive of mental processes without physical 
processes—as we do at the end of the second meditation—is consistent with straightforward 
analytic functionalism.  
However, whilst it is true that straightforward analytic functionalism is consistent with 
the conceivability of minds without brains, it is not true that straightforward analytic 
functionalism is consistent with the scenario we finish up conceiving of at the end of the 
second meditation. The thing we end of conceiving of at the end of the second meditation is 
not just a thing with mentality not realised in physical stuff, it is a thing with mentality not 
realised in any stuff. And it is not coherent to suppose that ‘the higher-order state of having 
some other state that plays the pain role’ exists in the absence of some other state that plays 
the pain role. 
The Australian analytic functionalist avoids this problem by identifying pain with the 
realiser of the pain role rather than with the pain role itself. It is then conceivable that pain is 
a fundamental state, as there are scenarios where a fundamental state plays the pain role in 
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the population being considered. Furthermore, there are coherent scenarios where pain does 
not play the pain role. In cases of what Lewis calls ‘mad pain’ there is an individual who 
instantiates the state which plays the pain role in her population, without it being the case that 
it plays the pain role in her.
6
 However, despite the ingenious flexibility of the Australian view, 
it does not allow that ‘pain’ has application in scenarios in which  nothing in existence plays 
the pain role. And yet when we reach the end of the second mediation, and we have a 
headache, we find ourselves conceiving of a scenario in which nothing plays the pain role and 
yet ‘pain’ still has application. 
In none of this discussion have we moved from the epistemological to the 
metaphysical. Analytic functionalists make certain claims about mental concepts, which have 
implications for what it is coherent to suppose. Those claims are inconsistent with the state of 
conceiving we end up in at the end of the second meditation. We are able to refute analytic 
functionalism by refuting its epistemological elements. Descartes admits in the second 
meditation that physical things—‘these very things which I am supposing to be nothing, 
because they are unknown to me’—may ‘in be reality identical with the ‘I’ of which I am 
aware’.
7
 The leap from the epistemological to the metaphysical must wait until the sixth 
meditation. 
 
2. The sixth meditation and the refutation of a posteriori physicalism 
In the sixth meditation, we find the following argument against materialism: 
 
First, I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of 
being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. Hence 
the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is 
enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they are capable of 
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being separated, at least by God. The question of what kind of power is required to 
bring about such a separation does not affect the judgement that the two things are 
distinct. . . . on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am 
simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of 
body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly it is 




We can lay the argument out as follows: 
 
Premise 1: Anything I can clearly and distinctly conceive of is possible. 
Premise 2: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind and brain/body existing 
independently of each other 
Conclusion 1: My mind and my brain/body could exist independently of each other.  
Premise 3: If my mind and brain/body could exist independently of each other then they 
are distinct substances. 
Conclusion 2: My mind and brain/body are distinct substances. 
 
Let us consider the premises of this argument in more detail. 
 
2.1 Premise 1 
When I was a first year philosophy undergraduate, I was taught that premise one of this 
argument could be swiftly refuted with the counterexample of water existing independently of 
H2O. It seems that we can conceive of a scenario in which water exists in the absence of H2O, 
for example a scenario in which experiments reveal water to have some other chemical 
composition. And yet if we infer from this the real possibility of water existing in the absence 
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of H2O, we are quickly led to the non-identity of water and H2O, contrary to what is in fact 
the case. 
This rejection of premise one is far too quick. Descartes doesn’t say that any old 
conceiving implies possibility, only that a clear and distinct conception implies possibility. I 
take it that whatever else having a clear and distinct conception involves, it involves 
understanding what you’re conceiving of. Suppose I think of electric charge as ‘that thing 
Dave (my physicist chum) was talking about the other night’ (where I use this description as a 
rigid designator), but have zero understanding of the defining characteristics of negative 
charge. It is clear that such a conception of negative charge is not clear and distinct. I can refer 
to negative charge, but there is a clear sense in which I don’t know what it is: I have no idea 
what it is for something to be negatively charged. I don’t have the understanding of the nature 
of negative charge that—let us suppose—my physicist chum Dave has. Although I can 
involve negative charge in what I am conceiving of, to the extent that I do I bring opacity into 
my conception.  
Such opacity brings in its wake coherent conceivability without possibility. I can 
coherently conceive of all sorts of scenarios in which ‘negative charge’ features—I might 
suppose that negative charge is what underlies a wizard’s ability to teleport—without this 
implying that negative charge really could be as I am supposing. My ignorance of the nature 
of negative charge licences a conceptual free for all.  
Our concept ‘water’ is also opaque in this sense. For something to be water is for it to be 
H2O. But this is not apparent, or a priori accessible, to me when I conceive of water as such. 
Again we have a licence for a conceptual free for all: the fact that I can coherently conceive of 
water’s having a chemical composition other than H2O has no modal implications.
9
 None of 
this takes us away from Descartes’ view as to the relationship between conceivability and 
possibility. Perhaps Descartes had a false view about the nature of our ordinary concept of 
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water, but had he taken it to be an opaque concept, that is to say, a concept that reveals little or 
nothing about the nature of its referent, he would no doubt have denied that our conception of 
water when deploying that concept is clear and distinct, and hence denied that such 
conceptions have modal ramifications. On the assumption that a clear and distinct conception 
must involve only transparent concepts, that is, concepts that reveal the complete essence of 
the states they denote, the conceivably impossible scenario of water existing in the absence of 
H2O does not constitute a counterexample to premise 1.  
Indeed, once premise 1 is clarified in this way, it is not clear that there are any 
counterexamples to it. Putting aside the mind-body case as contentious, the examples one 
finds in the literature—individuals with origins distinct from their actual origins, or natural 
kinds with essences distinct from their actual essences—all seem to involve things being 
thought about under opaque concepts; in each case if we knew the essence or essential origins 
of the thing being thought about, the scenario in question would not be conceivable. 
Furthermore, there are clear benefits to the view that conceivability and possibility are linked 
in something like the way Descartes took them to be. It provides a clear and plausible account 
of how we know about possibility, and it offers the hope of an attractive reduction of modal 
truths in terms of facts about ideal conceivability (under transparent concepts).
10
 Where it not 
for the trouble it makes for physicalism, perhaps this traditional view of the relationship 
between conceivability and possibility might not have fallen from favour. 
 
2.2 Premise 2 
When I reach the end of the second meditation, when I have stripped away everything it 
is possible to doubt and alighted upon the certain knowledge of my existence as a 
thinking/experiencing thing, I end up conceiving of my mind existing in the absence of 
anything physical. But is this conception clear and distinct? If either the concept of my mind, 
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or the general concept of the physical, is not fully transparent, then the resulting conception 
will fail to be clear and distinct. 
Arnauld complained that Descartes had not demonstrated that our concepts of body and 
mind were adequate. Certainly they seem to reveal something of the nature of the substance 
they denote, but how can we know that they reveal its entire nature? Arnauld supports his 
argument by means of an analogy. Two things are worth noting about Arnauld’s analogy: (i) it 
involves properties rather than substances (as Descartes notes in his reply
11
), (ii) it involves 
subtle a priori knowledge concerning those properties: 
 
Suppose someone knows for certain that the angle in a semi-circle is a right angle, and 
hence that the triangle formed by this angle and the diameter of the circle is right-
angled. In spite of this, he may doubt, or not yet have grasped for certain, that the square 
on the hypotenuse is equal to the squares on the other two sides; indeed he may even 




For this to be analogous to the mind-body case, the following would have to be the case. 
The reason we are able, at the end of the second meditation, to doubt the instantiation of 
physical properties without doubting the instantiation of mental properties, is that we have not 
worked out the subtle conceptual connection between the mental and the physical. On further 
reflection, it would turn out to be incoherent to suppose that, say, my current feeling of pain 
exists whilst nothing physical does, just as it turns out to be incoherent to suppose that the 
angle in a semi-circle is a right angle and yet the square of the hypotenuse (of a triangle 
formed from this angle) is not equal to the squares on the other two sides. 
However, consider what such a subtle conceptual connection would involve. Nobody 
takes seriously the idea that there is a conceptual connection between mental properties and 
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specific physical properties, such as the firing of c-fibres. If this were the case, then 
neuroscience would be an a priori science. And so inevitably any supposed conceptual 
connection must be between mental properties and certain functional role properties, such that 
in the actual world those functional properties are realised by physical properties. If Arnauld’s 
objection is to have any force, we must turn to analytic functionalism. 
As we have seen, at the end of the second meditation we are conceiving of mental 
properties in the absence of such functional role properties, as we are doubting the latter but 
certain of the former. The analytic functionalist development of Arnauld’s point would go as 
follows:  
 
We are only able to simultaneously suppose the existence of mental properties and 
doubt the existence of causal role properties because we have not reflected enough. 
Further reflection would reveal such a scenario to be incoherent. 
 
However, it is not plausible to suppose that there is a conceptual connection between 
mental and causal role properties which it is too subtle to be noticed without some incredibly 
sophisticated reflection. We are not dealing with complicated mathematics here. Rather the 
analytic functionalist proposal is that causal role properties constitute the basic a priori 
content of mental concepts, that to suppose that someone is in pain just is to suppose that 
someone has an inner state that plays the pain role. If this were true, then at the end of the 
second meditation Descartes would be contradicting himself in the most perverse and 
straightforward way. This is simply not plausible. 
Therefore, understood as a point about subtle conceptual connections between mental 
properties and physical or functional properties, Arnauld’s concern has little force. However, 
there is still a serious issue concerning how Descartes can rule out that mental and physical 
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concepts fail to reveal the complete essences of the entities they denote. It is especially 
difficult to see how Descartes can rule this out concerning our concepts of mental and 
physical substances, as opposed to properties, which is of course the very kind of concepts he 
uses in his argument.  
At the end of the second meditation, I am thinking of myself in terms of my mental 
properties. But how can I rule out that there is more to my nature than those mental properties 
I am using to think about myself? For the reasons I give above, it is implausible to suppose 
that there are some subtle corporeal aspects to my nature that are conceptually implied by the 
way I am conceiving of myself at the end of the second meditation. Nonetheless, there may be 
corporeal aspects of the ‘I’ I am conceiving of at the end of the second mediation which have 
no conceptual association with the mental properties in terms of which I am conceiving of that 
‘I’. For this reason, it seems to me that Descartes’ argument fails as an argument for substance 
dualism, on the grounds that Descartes is unable to demonstrate that the concept of myself I 
have at the end of the second meditation  reveals my complete nature, and hence is unable to 
demonstrate that premise two is true.  
However, I want to suggest that the argument can be modified to form a successful 
argument for property dualism, by substituting the following for premise 2: 
 
Premise 2*: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mental properties existing in the 
absence of any neurophysiological or functional properties. 
 
and the following for premise 3: 
Premise 3*: If my mental properties could exist independently of any 
neurophysiological or functional properties, then my mental properties are not identical 
to any neurophysiological or functional properties. 
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When I reach the end of the second meditation, I am conceiving of my mental properties 
existing in the absence of any physical or functional properties. But is this a clear and distinct 
conception? Could it be that the properties denoted by my mental concepts are in fact physical 
or functional properties, even though this is not apparent a priori? Or could it be that the 
properties denoted by my physical properties are in fact mental properties, even though this is 
not apparent a priori? Let us take both of these possibilities in turn. 
 
2.3 Mental concepts 
These days analytic functionalism isn’t so popular, and most philosophers of mind 
accept the existence of distinctively mental concepts which bear no a priori connection to 
physical or functional concepts. However, physicalists tend to embrace a semantic externalist 
account of the reference of such concepts. The reference of our mental concepts, on such a 
view, is determined by facts outside of what is a priori accessible: causal connections, sub-
personal recognitional capacities of the concept user, or facts about the evolved function of 
our mental concepts.
13
 If the reference of our mental concepts is determined by facts outside 
of what is a priori accessible, then mental concepts lack a priori content, they are utterly 
opaque ‘blind pointers’. Just as we pick out water as ‘that stuff whatever it is’ (pointing with 
our fingers), so we pick out pain as ‘that state, whatever it is’ (pointing introspectively). It 
turns out, thinks the physicalist, that in each case ‘that state whatever it is’ is a brain state. 
If this kind of view is correct, then we do not have a clear and distinct conception of our 
mental properties when we think of them under mental concepts, and premise 2* is false. But 
such a view of our mental concepts is utterly implausible. Perhaps the best way to see the 
implausibility is to return to the second meditation. Recall how one ends up conceiving of 
oneself at the end of the second meditation: 
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. . . what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, 
affirms denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions 





On the semantic externalist model, each of the mental concepts involved in this 
description is a blind pointer, revealing nothing about what it is for something to be in the 
state denoted. But it is evident when I am in it that the conception I have of myself at the end 
of the second meditation, when I have doubted away the physical world, is a rich, substantive 
conception of myself. If I know of someone (myself, or someone else) that they are doubting 
such and such, or understanding such and such, or believing or wanting such and such, or that 
they are having certain sensory experiences as though such and such were the case, I 
understand a great deal about that person’s nature. I am not just blindly denoting their 
qualities. 
Gassendi seems to worry in one of his objections to Descartes that to conceive of 
himself as a mental thing is not to have a substantive conception of his nature: 
 
Who doubts that you are thinking? What we are unclear about, what we are looking for, 
is that inner substance of yours whose property is to think. Your conclusion should be 
related to this inquiry, and should tell us not that you are a thinking thing, but what sort 
of thing this ‘you’ who thinks really is. If we are asking about wine, and looking for the 
kind of knowledge which is superior to common knowledge, it will hardly be enough 
for you to say ‘wine is a liquid thing, which is compressed from grapes, white or red, 
sweet, intoxicating’ and so on. You will have to attempt to investigate and somehow 
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explain its internal substance, showing how it can be seen to be manufactured from 
spirits, tartar, the distillate, and other ingredients mixed together in such and such 
quantities and proportions. Similarly, given that you are looking for knowledge of 
yourself which is superior to common knowledge (that is, the kind of knowledge we 
have had up till now), you must see that it is certainly not enough for you to announce 
that you are a thing that thinks and doubts and understands, etc. You should carefully 
scrutinise yourself and conduct, as it were, a kind of chemical investigation of yourself, 




Descartes replies ‘I have never thought that anything more is required to reveal a 
substance than its various attributes; thus the more attributes of a given substance we know, 
the more perfectly we understand its nature.’
16
 I would want to make a slightly more qualified 
claim: all that is required to reveal a substance is knowledge of its attributes under 
transparent concepts. The description Gassendi offers of wine is formed of opaque concepts, 
which fail to tell us the real nature of wine: ‘wine is a liquid thing, which is compressed from 
grapes, white or red, sweet, intoxicating.’ In such a case, empirical investigation is required to 
make progress on understanding the nature of wine.
17
 Gassendi has correctly identified some 
common or garden concepts which happen to be opaque. But it of course does not follow that 
all of our common or garden concepts are opaque. Whether or not mental concepts are fully 
transparent I shall consider shortly. But it is evident that the conception of myself I have at the 
end of the second meditation is not entirely opaque; it reveals to me at least something of my 
nature. 
The second meditation alone, then, provides the resources to refute both the dominant 
form of a priori physicalism and the dominant form of a posteriori physicalism. Once 
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Descartes has guided me to a conception of myself as a pure and lonely thinker, it is evident 
that: 
 
A. I can coherently suppose that nothing exists other than myself and my conscious 
experience, from which I can infer that analytic functionalism is false. 
B. I am having a rich and substantive conception of my nature, from which I can 
infer that the semantic externalist model of mental concepts favoured by most 
contemporary physicalists is false. 
 
It is worth noting that both of these positions can be ruled out without moving from the 
epistemic to the metaphysical. These specific physicalist views make specific claims about 
mental concepts which are inconsistent with the fact that the conception I have of myself at 
the end of the second meditation is substantive and consistent. However, if we want to refute 
a more general conception of physicalism, rather than specific (albeit very widespread) 
versions of it, we must try to make that move from conceivability to possibility by justifying 
premise 2* or something like it. 
Our mental concepts are certainly not opaque, but does it follow that they are 
transparent, revealing everything of the nature of the mental properties they denote? Perhaps 
rather they are translucent, revealing some but not all of the nature of mental properties. 
Although in conversation many philosophers seem attracted to the idea that mental concepts 
are translucent, there are not many worked out versions of the view. A fully worked out 
theory of mental concepts as translucent would have to answer the following question: which 
aspects of a mental state such as pain do we transparently understand, and which aspects do 
we merely opaquely denote? It’s hard to see what the answer to this question would be even 
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in the case of a sensory state such as pain, but it’s even less clear what we could say when it 
comes to cognitive states such as believing that it’s raining.
18
  
However, even if it turns out that mental concepts are translucent, we could simply shift 
the focus of the argument from mental states to those aspects of mental states that are 
transparently revealed to us, call these ‘mental* properties.’ We can thus substitute premise 
2* for premise 2**: 
 
Premise 2**: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mental* properties existing in 
the absence of any neurophysiological or functional properties. 
 
and premise 3* for premise 3**: 
 
Premise 3**: If my mental* properties could exist independently of any 
neurophysiological or functional properties, then my mental* properties are not 
identical to any neurophysiological or functional properties. 
 
It would be sufficient to refute physicalism if my mental* properties can be shown to be 
distinct from any functional or neurophysiological properties.  
What about neurophysiological or functional concepts? It seems clear that functional 
concepts are transparent; a description specifying a causal role property in terms of its 
complete causal role completely specifies the nature of that property. The matter is slightly 
less clear with regards to neurophysiological properties. When a neurologist talks about ‘c-
fibres’ is she talking about a state of the brain whose nature is entirely captured by what 
neuroscience has to tell us about that state, or she talking about a state picked out by what 
brain science has to tell us about it, but which may have a nature that goes beyond what brain 
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science can tell us about it? If the latter then premise 2* is false, as neurophysiological 
concepts turn out to be translucent or opaque, and hence brain science cannot afford us a clear 
and distinct conception of the properties of the brain. 
This dispute seems to me to be largely terminological. No doubt the brain scientist, with 
more important matters to attend to than metaphysics, employs concepts which are 
indeterminate between these two options. It is up to us to decide what we mean by our talk of 
physical brain properties. The spirit of physicalism would seem to dictate that we define our 
talk of physical brain properties such that their nature can be entirely captured by 
neuroscience, or by neuroscience in conjunction with more basic physical sciences.
19
 At any 
rate, if we can get an argument that refutes the kind of ‘physicalist’ who believes that the 
nature of mental properties can be fully revealed by the physical sciences then we have a 
significant argument. I therefore stipulate that by ‘neurophysiological properties’ I mean those 
properties which are transparently revealed to us by brain science (or brain science in 
conjunction with more basic sciences of matter—see footnote 19).  
We have therefore demonstrated that all the concepts involved in premise 2* are 
transparent. The physicalist might continue to insist that the conception we reach at the end of 
meditation two is in some way obscure, confused or incoherent. But she is obliged to show 
this, and until she does, we are entitled to suppose that it is clear and distinct, as indeed it 
seems to be.  
I take it that premise 3* is almost entirely uncontroversial, and hence we have a sound 
argument, from the resources of the Meditations, for the falsity of physicalism understood as 
the view that mental (or mental*) properties are either (i) identical with properties the nature 
of which is entirely revealed to us by neurophysiology, or (ii) identical with functional 




Premise 1: Anything I can clearly and distinctly conceive of is possible. 
Premise 2*: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mental (or mental*) properties 
existing in the absence of any neurophysiological or functional properties. 
Conclusion 1: My mental (or mental*) properties could exist in the absence of any 
neurophysiological or functional properties.  
Premise 3*: If my mental (or mental*) properties could exist independently of any 
neurophysiological or functional properties, then my mental properties are not identical 
with any neurophysiological or functional properties. 
Conclusion 2: My mental (or mental*) properties are not identical with any 
neurophysiological or functional properties. 
 
3. The non-physicality of thought 
Most anti-physicalist arguments of the past eighty years have tried to demonstrate that 
conscious states, defined as being states such that there is something that it is like to be in 
them, are distinct from physical or functional states. It was for a long time generally accepted 
that a functionalist account of cognitive states is satisfactory. There have of late been a 
growing number of philosophers arguing that cognitive states are in fact identical with, or 
grounded in, conscious states.
20
 If this is the case, and if we have sound arguments for anti-
physicalism about conscious states, it would seem to follow that we should be anti-
physicalists about cognitive states. 
However, it remains extremely difficult to settle the matter of whether cognitive states, 
such as thinking that it’s raining, count as states such that there is ‘something that it’s like’ to 




 which has its paradigm extension in the sensory realm, has application in the realm 
of thought. 
The Cartesian argument directly supports the non-physicality of cognitive states, 
without relying on the thesis that they are states of consciousness. At the end of the second 
meditation – when I have doubted the entire physical world – I am not only conceiving of 
myself as a thing with sensory states; I am also conceiving of myself as a thing that thinks, 
that doubts, that is willing or unwilling: I am conceiving of myself as a thing with 
propositional attitudes. All of these states can be clearly and distinctly conceived of in the 
absence of anything physical or functional, and hence the Cartesian argument demonstrates 
that all of these states are non-physical.  
The Cartesian argument shows, therefore, that we have not only a ‘hard problem’ of 
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1
 To make the claim slightly more carefully, for each proposition that you can grasp you 
would be able to work out its truth value. 
2
 Perhaps someone who had never seen red or tasted a lemon would not have a mental 
concept of what it’s like to see red or taste a lemon. But it seems that even if you did have a 
full concept of, say, what it’s like to taste a lemon, perhaps gained through tasting lemons 
whilst blindfolded, you would not be able to know from a neurophysiological description of a 
lemon experience that it satisfied that concept.  
3
 Armstrong 1968, Lewis 1966, 1970, 1980, 1994. 
4
 Descartes classes sensory experiences as a kind of thought. 
5
 Lewis 1980. 
6
 Lewis 1980. 
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7
 Descartes 1645: 18. 
8
 Descartes 1645: 54. 
9
 Perhaps it is slight exaggeration to say that there are no modal implications of the 
conceivability of water with a chemical composition other that H2O. The important point is 
that, because of the opacity of the concept ‘water’, we cannot infer from the conceivability to 
the possibility of this state of affairs. 
10
 I outline such a reduction in more detail in Goff and Papineau forthcoming and Goff MS. 
11
 Descartes 1645: 110-2. 
12
 Descartes 1645: 109. 
13
 See Loar 1990, Papineau 2002, Perry 2001, Tye 1995. 
14
 Descartes 1645: 19. 
15
 Descartes 1645: 71. 
16
 Descartes 1645: 72. 
17
 In fact, I am inclined to think that even empirical investigation won’t reveal the essence of 
wine, as observation reveals only the extrinsic features of material things. But the important 
point here is the negative one that our ordinary concept of wine does not reveal the essence of 
its referent. 
18
 Robert Schroer (2010) offers a view according to which concepts of sensory states reveal 
the internal structure of those states, but opaquely denote the atomic elements involved in that 
structure. The view that only structural aspects of my nature are revealed to me in the 
conception I have of myself at the end of the second meditation, seems to me not that much 
more plausible than the view that no aspects of my nature are revealed to me in the 
conception I have of myself at the end of the second meditation. More importantly, this 
model cannot be applied to cognitive states. 
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19
 A natural view would be that neuroscience reveals brain states to be essentially constituted 
of certain more basic physical elements, and that the essences of those more basic elements 
are revealed by more basic sciences of matter. 
20
 For a good range of essays on both sides of the debate, see Bayne and Montague 2011 and 
Kriegal 2013. 
21
 Nagel 1975. 
